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The Administrative Control Board of the District, which currently is
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LeGrand W. Bitter, Executive Director of the District
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Mark Graham ("Graham") argues that staff time can be charged to a
requester of records under GRAMA only if staff is employed in reformatting the
records into media other than how they are kept by the governmental entity (e.g., paper
to computer disk or laser disk). Under his interpretation, government staff could be
diverted from their normal duties and spend hundreds, if not thousands, of hours
compiling records for inspection by a requester, but if the records are kept in paper
format by the government and requested to be compiled in paper format for the
requester, no staff time charges could be made.
This result cannot be what the Utah Legislature intended. If Graham is
right, environmental activists, like himself, and others who oppose the District's1 solid
waste operations for one reason or another could literally pummel the District with
far-reaching requests for records under GRAMA and bring District operations to a halt.
They would avoid paying staff time costs by simply requesting that the records be
produced in the same media maintained by the District. The same could also happen to
state agencies that are subject to GRAMA's provisions. Government could be brought
to its knees. Graham is wrong, and the Court should affirm the trial court's recognition

1

The "District" means collectively defendants, appellees, and
cross-appellants Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special
Service District, the District's Administrative Control Board, and LeGrand Bitter, the
District's Executive Director.
1

that Graham's arguments are "nonsensical" and "could only with great difficulty be
seriously argued." R. 253.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998). The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1998), and that court transferred the case to
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1998).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW2
1.

Did the substitution of Graham as plaintiff simply commence an

entirely new, but at that point untimely, appeal from an administrative action of the
District where the original complaint was void because it was filed by an
unincorporated committee representing itself pro se, which committee was prohibited
from access to Utah's courts for failure to comply with the Utah Assumed Name
Statute?
This issue was raised by the District in its Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment, R. 46-47, and in its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to File an Amended Complaint and in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. R. 49-63. The trial court ruled in Graham's favor

2

The District notes that Graham does not set forth in his Issues Presented
for Review where each issue was preserved in the trial court.
2

on this issue and allowed him to be substituted as plaintiff, with the substitution relating
back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. R. 144-53.
This is an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. Drake v.
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
2.

Does the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act,

Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101, et seq. (1997) ("GRAMA"), allow a governmental entity
to charge fees for staff time incurred filling a records request only when the requester
asks that the records be put in an entirely different format than the records are
maintained by the governmental entity, thereby allowing a requester to completely
avoid staff time charges, no matter how much time may be required to fill the request,
by simply requesting that records be produced in the same format as maintained by the
entity?
The trial court ruled in the District's favor on this issue. R. 245-53. It is
an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah,
939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
3.

If Graham prevails on this appeal, should he be awarded attorney

fees under GRAMA even though the District's decision concerning the staff time
charges at issue had a reasonable basis as demonstrated by the trial court's carefully
reasoned opinion in the District's favor, even though factual issues would need to be
resolved before an award of attorney fees could be made, and even though claims for
3

attorney fees are subject to the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act?
Because the trial court ruled in the District's favor, it did not award
Graham any attorney fees. R. 253.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND LEGAL PROVISIONS
Copies of the following determinative statutory and legal provisions are
reproduced in Addendum A, except the District's Ordinance No. 92-C, which is
reproduced in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5 (1997)
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (1997)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201(1) (1997)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-203(2), (7) and (8) (1997)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802 (1997)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 (1997)
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)
UtahR. Civ. P. 17(a)
The District's Ordinance No. 92-C

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in
the Trial Court,

Graham seeks review of an order of the trial court dismissing an appeal
from an administrative decision under GRAMA made by the District's Administrative
Control Board. R. 245-53. Graham, as a member and on behalf of an unincorporated
committee called the Residents of Davis County Clear Air Committee (the "Clear Air
Committee"), sought to inspect certain records maintained by the District. R. 23. The
District refused to allow the Clear Air Committee to review the records prior to
payment of a nominal amount to cover 14 hours of staff time incurred by District staff
retrieving and compiling the records. R. 24, 27, 28, 32-33. The District's
Administrative Control Board affirmed the District's executive director's decision on
this issue. R. 34.
The Clear Air Committee, representing itself pro se through Graham,
who is not a licensed attorney, filed a complaint in the trial court appealing the
District's decision. R. 1-34. The District moved to dismiss because, among other
reasons, the Clear Air Committee had not registered its assumed name with the Utah
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, and because the Clear Air Committee
cannot represent itself in court pro se. R. 46-47. Graham moved to "amend" the

5

complaint by substituting himself as plaintiff. R. 114-15. The trial court granted
Graham's motion to amend and denied the District's motion to dismiss. R. 144-53.
Thereafter, Graham filed a motion for summary judgment on the merits,
and the District filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 159-73, 174-200. On
April 6, 1998, the trial court granted the District's cross-motion for summary judgment
in a nine-page decision. R. 245-53.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Graham is an individual who is also a member of the Clear Air
Committee. R. 146. The Clear Air Committee is allegedly "a non-profit organization
dedicated to minimizing air pollution in Davis County." R. 1. Graham is not licensed
to practice law in Utah. R. 146. Graham is only one of several members of the Clear
Air Committee, as evidenced by correspondence to the District from the Committee
signed by several individuals. R. 67.
Defendant Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery
Special Service District is a political subdivision of the state of Utah and a
"governmental entity" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9) (1997). R. 245.
Defendant Administrative Control Board is the governing body of the district and has
the legal authority to make determinations regarding public access to records in the
district's offices and agencies. The Administrative Control Board is also a
"governmental entity" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9) (1997). R. 246.
6

Defendant LeGrand Bitter is the Executive Director of the district. The Executive
Director's office is a "governmental entity" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9)
(1997). Id.
In February and April of 1997, the District performed initial compliance
testing as required by Condition No. 8 of Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96 dated
September 10, 1996 ("Approval Order") issued by the State of Utah Department of
Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality. Id. On April 28, 1997, Graham, on
behalf of the Clear Air Committee, submitted a written request to the District pursuant
to GRAMA seeking to inspect and copy certain government records related to the
District's February and April 1997 air emissions stack testing. R. 3, 23, 246.
The request asked for:
1. The current contract(s) between the Special
Service District and Dr. H. Gregor Rigo and/or his firm,
Rigo & Rigo Associates;
2. Records relating to the stack test(s) conducted
during January and/or February, 1997, namely:
a. samples taken, journals, personal field notes,
and inspection logs
b. laboratory analysis of air samples taken
c. any correspondence between the District and
the entities responsible for gathering and/or
analyzing and evaluating the air samples
subsequent to the date of sampling

7

d. memos or internal documents (within the
Special Service District) relating to the stack test
or the laboratory analysis
e. any deviation or departure from the prescribed methods for
gathering samples and their reason(s), or problems encountered
during the sample gathering process
R. 23, 246-47.
In response, the District provided some of the requested records. R. 3,
24, 247. The District also informed Graham that other documents the Clear Air
Committee requested, amounting to hundreds of pages of unbound documents, would
be made available after payment of $280, based on 14 hours of staff time necessary to
retrieve and compile the documents. R. 3, 28, 247.
Because of the variety of records involved in accommodating the Clear
Air Committee's request, the District could not and did not store them in one
document, computer program, or central file. The District had to take files,
documents, and data from several sources and organize them in order to respond to the
request. The District made a thorough search of all files and records related to the
testing to ensure that the District produced everything relevant. R. 240, 248.
To do so, it was necessary for the District to contact those people who
may have been involved in the testing at issue and obtain their assistance. John
Watson, Bart Baker, certain operators and maintenance personnel, and Jack Schmidt
searched, retrieved, and compiled the records requested by the Clear Air Committee.
8

Collectively, they spent a total of 14 hours. The District retrieved and compiled
information from District files located at individual employees' work stations,
day timers, operator logs, testing protocols, general District files that may relate to
testing, and a computer database. Research on the computer database was a timeconsuming process. The database is continually updated, and after a period of time,
information stored in the database is downloaded to tape. Some of the information the
Clear Air Committee requested had been stored on tape, requiring an operator to peruse
the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the information requested.
R. 240-41,248.
In compliance with GRAMA and the District's GRAMA Ordinance {see
Addendum B, Ordinance No. 92-C), the District does not charge for time incurred in
reviewing the records to determine whether they are private, controlled, or protected
under GRAMA, although a review of the records the Clear Air Committee requested
was made to make such a determination. Staff time charges assessed by the District on
the Clear Air Committee's records request were based on the Ordinance, but were less
than actual cost because employees who reviewed files to find the requested records are
paid more than $20 per hour. R. 241-42, 248-49.
On or about June 9, 1997, Graham appealed to the District's Executive
Director the decision to charge $20 per hour for staff time. R. 3, 29-31, 247.
Graham's appeal to the District's Executive Director was denied. Graham was also
9

informed of the right to appeal the Executive Director's decision to the District's
Administrative Control Board. R. 4, 32-33, 247.
On July 2, 1997, Graham appeared before the Administrative Control
Board to appeal the Executive Director's decision. R. 247. At this hearing, he made it
clear that he was appearing on behalf of the Clear Air Committee. R. 4, 82. By letter
dated July 3, 1997, the Board notified Graham that it denied the Clear Air Committee's
appeal by a unanimous vote of its members. The Board found that "[t]he evidence
presented to the Board demonstrated that significant time had been incurred by staff to
retrieve and compile the records you seek to review. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-203(2)(a) and (b), and Ordinance No. 92-C, section 10, of the District, the
Executive Director properly requested that you pay the reasonable cost of staff
time—14 hours at $20.00 per hour—prior to review of the records." R. 4, 34, 247. On
July 8, 1997, Graham sent another letter to the District confirming that the appeal to
the Administrative Control Board had been taken by the Clear Air Committee. R. 91.
On July 30, 1997, the Clear Air Committee filed this lawsuit appealing
the Administrative Control Board's decision. R. 1,6, 247. The Clear Air Committee
filed it purporting to represent itself pro se through Graham. R. 1,6. As of that date,
the Clear Air Committee had not registered its name with the Utah Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code. R. 93-96.

10

On September 19, 1997, Graham, who was not a party, moved the trial
court for an order allowing him to "amend" the complaint to substitute himself,
individually, for the Clear Air Committee as the named party plaintiff. R. 114-15. The
District opposed the motion and filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
arguing that because Graham was not licensed as an attorney and because the Clear Air
Committee had not properly registered its name pursuant to the Assumed Name Statute,
the filing of the complaint was void. Substituting Graham as the plaintiff would
constitute the initiation of a new action that would be untimely. R. 46-113.
On November 18, 1997, the trial court entered a memorandum decision
granting Graham's motion to be substituted as the plaintiff in this action and denied the
District's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. R. 144-53. A copy of this
ruling is attached as Addendum C. The trial court ruled that although the District was
correct that Graham could not represent the Clear Air Committee pro se, his filing of
the complaint on behalf of the Clear Air Committee was not void ab initio. Allowing
Graham to substitute himself as plaintiff would correct that problem. R. 148-49. The
trial court also ruled that it was not clear that the Clear Air Committee had to comply
with the provisions of the Utah Assumed Name Statute because the court was "not
entirely convinced that a community association organized for the purposes of
monitoring pollution compliance is carrying on, conducting, or transacting business
such to put it within the purview of" the Assumed Name Statute. R. 149. In any
11

event, the trial court believed allowing Graham to be substituted as plaintiff corrected
the problem. Id. Finally, the trial court believed that there were issues of fact whether
the Clear Air Committee was the only proper party plaintiff, and it believed, based on
the evidence before it, that the Clear Air Committee and Graham had sufficient identity
of interests to allow relation back of the substitution. R. 149-51.
Thereafter, on January 16, 1998, Graham filed a motion for summary
judgment on the applicable language of GRAMA. R. 159. The District responded
with a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 9, 1998. R. 174-75.
On April 6, 1998, the trial court issued a Ruling on Plaintiffs and
Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. R. 245-53. A copy of this ruling
is attached as Addendum D. The trial court accepted the District's statement of
undisputed facts, R. 245 n.l, and noted that the crux of the dispute focused on the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) (1997). This section provides in relevant
part:
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form
other than that normally maintained by the governmental
entity, the actual costs under this section may include the
following:
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling,
or tailoring the record either into an organization or
media to meet the person's request;
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and
other direct administrative costs for complying with a
12

request. The hourly charge may not exceed the salary
of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of
the custodian of records, has the necessary skill and
training to perform the request; provided, however,
that no charge may be made for the first quarter hour
of staff time; and
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the
result of computer output other than word
processing, the actual incremental cost of
providing the electronic services and products
together with a reasonable portion of the costs
associated with formatting or interfacing the
information for particular users, and the
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections
(2)(a) and (b).
R. 250.
The trial court wrote that "Plaintiffs critical argument revolves around
the meaning of the words 'compile' and 'form' and their context, in the phrase: 'When
a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normally maintained
by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this section may include the
following: [.]'" R. 250-51. It noted that "Plaintiff argues that the meanings of
'compile' and 'form' are vague and ambiguous and as such must be construed as
narrowly as possible, thereby excluding all charges for any records that are already
maintained by the government agency, and only allowing charges for a record that is
'transformed' into a different record." R. 251.

13

After stating basic rules of statutory construction, the trial court ruled for
the District. It held:
In the Court's opinion, the statute is neither vague
nor ambiguous, nor is it difficult to construct, given the
plain meaning of its terms. Defendants provide that
Webster's New World Dictionary defines "compile" as: "to
gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly
form" and "to compose (a book, etc.) of materials gathered
from various sources." Webster's defines "form," inter
alia, as: "the particular mode of existence a thing has or
takes;" "arrangement, esp. orderly arrangement; way in
which parts of a whole are organized; pattern; style. . ."
Plaintiffs request consists of records falling into five
separate categories (see, Court's Findings of Fact No. 6,
a-e, supra). Defendants' unrebutted evidence, from the
affidavit of John K. Schmidt submitted in support of their
memorandum, shows that 14 hours of staff time was spent in
responding to plaintiffs request (see, Court's Findings of
Fact Nos. 17-23, supra). From the facts submitted it is
quite clear to the Court that the requested fee was incurred
as a direct result of the District's "summarizing, compiling
[and] tailoring the record either into an organization or
media to meet the person's request;" their "search, retrieval,
and other direct administrative costs for complying with
[the] request;["] and "the actual incremental cost of
providing the electronic services and products together with
a reasonable portion of the costs associated with formatting
or interfacing the information for particular users, and the
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and
(b)."
. . . As made clear by defendants, the records were
kept in neither the form nor the media requested by plaintiff
and they therefore needed to be "compiled" into that form to
conform to his requests.

14

The Court finds that the common meaning of the
terms "compile" and "form" would include the work
performed by the District. As further support, the context
of the words within the statute supports this conclusion.
"Compile" is the only verb in U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2)
defining what actual costs may be charged for. Therefore,
as the same section goes on to state "the actual costs under
this section may include the following . . . ," any of the
tasks listed at 63-2-203(2)(a) through (c) must, by necessity,
be encompassed within the term "compile." Any other
reading of the section would be nonsensical, and, in the
Court's opinion, could only with great difficulty be
seriously argued.
R. 251-53 (bold emphasis added; other emphasis in original).
Graham timely filed his notice of appeal on May 5, 1998, R. 258-60, and
the defendants timely filed their notice of cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of
the District's motion to dismiss on May 19, 1998. R. 272-73.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court should not have reached the merits of this case because it
lacked jurisdiction. The Clear Air Committee's filing of the original complaint was
void because it cannot represent pro se and because it is barred from access to the
courts of Utah for failure to comply with Utah's Assumed Name Statute. Because the
original complaint was void, Graham's substitution as plaintiff commenced an entirely
new, but by that time an untimely, appeal from the District's decision.
If this Court concludes that the trial court had jurisdiction, the trial court's
decision on the merits should be affirmed in all respects. The District had to spent 14
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hours of staff time compiling the records the Clear Air Committee requested. Due to
the nature of the requests, the District had to thoroughly review District records and
computer databases and cull those records requested by the Clear Air Committee. In
doing so, under the plain meaning of the words "compile" and "form," the District
compiled the records in a form not normally maintained by the District, but in a form
specifically requested by the Clear Air Committee.
Public policy demands such a result. If records requesters only are
required by GRAMA to pay for staff time incurred filling a records request when the
requester specifically asks that the records be put in an entirely different format or
media, requesters could avoid costs, yet needlessly tie up government operations, by
simply requesting that paper records be produced on paper, computer records on
computer disks, and so forth. By requiring requesters to pay staff time incurred
compiling records, as requesters must pay under other public access laws such as the
Freedom of Information Act, it will encourage requesters to draft their requests
narrowly to seek only the information they really need and will protect the public
coffers when a request necessarily requires significant staff time to fill.
Graham is not entitled to attorney fees and costs because the District's
position has a reasonable basis. The District's position prevailed in the trial court and
will prevail on appeal. However, if Graham prevails, attorney fees still are not
justified because the District had a reasonable basis for its actions. At the very least, a
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determination of whether Graham is entitled to attorney fees requires a remand to the
trial court to resolve issues of fact and Graham's compliance with the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE CLEAR AIR COMMITTEE'S COMPLAINT WAS VOID WHEN FILED
AND GRAHAM'S SUBSTITUTION AS PLAINTIFF COMMENCED A
NEW ACTION THAT WAS NOT TIMELY3
The Clear Air Committee's original complaint was void when it was filed
because the Clear Air Committee cannot represent itself in court pro se and because it
was prohibited from access to the courts for failure to register its assumed name.
Therefore, an appeal from the Administrative Control Board's decision was never
perfected within the time period allowed. Because the complaint was void when filed,
Graham's substitution as plaintiff commenced a new action, but one that was untimely
and should have been dismissed.
The Utah Supreme Court has written that "[i]t has long been the law of
this jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed
3

The District would prefer to have the Court rule on the merits of
Graham's appeal, but because a serious question exists concerning whether the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction the District feels duty-bound to protect the
integrity of the Court by raising and addressing this issue.
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attorney." Tracy-Burke Assoc, v. Department of Employment Sec, Industrial Comm'n
of Utah, 699 P.2d 687, 687 (Utah 1985).
A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial
entity created by law and as such it can neither practice law
nor appear or act in person. Out of court it must act in its
affairs through its agents and representatives and in matters
in court it can act only through licensed attorneys. A
corporation cannot appear in court by an officer who is not
an attorney and it cannot appear in propria persona.
Id. at 687; accord Turtle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n, 350 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1960)
(citing Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.2d 867, 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)). Indeed,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 (1996) specifically prohibits both corporations and
voluntary associations, like the Clear Air Committee, from practicing law.4
The California Court of Appeals held in Paradise that a notice of appeal
and an opposition brief filed pro se by a corporation was "void by reason of the
corporation's lack of power to represent itself in an action in court." 195 P.2d at 867
(emphasis added). In Tracy-Burke, the Utah Supreme Court relied on Paradise to
dismiss a petition for a writ of review challenging a decision of the Industrial
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary
association . . . to hold itself out to the public by
advertisement or otherwise as being entitled to practice law
or to furnish attorneys or counselors, or to render legal
services or advice of any kind in any action or proceeding,
or to solicit directly or indirectly any claim or demand for
the purpose of bringing action thereon . . . .
18

Commission because the petition had been filed by the corporation pro se. 699 P.2d at
687. If the corporation's actions in Tracy-Burke had not been void when filed, the
actions could have been corrected by the appearance of an attorney for the corporation.
Yet, the Supreme Court, implying that the filing by the corporation itself could not be
corrected, dismissed the petition outright rather than instructing the corporation to have
counsel make an appearance.
This is significant because the petition in Tracy-Burke was essentially the
same type of proceeding filed by the Clear Air Committee in this case—it was an appeal
to a court from a decision of an administrative agency. Graham, as a member of the
Clear Air Committee, but not a licensed attorney, filed the complaint pro se for the
Clear Air Committee as an appeal from the Administrative Control Board's decision.
Because the Clear Air Committee is a voluntary unincorporated association, it cannot
practice law by itself. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40. As such, the filing of the
complaint was void under Tracy-Burke and Paradise.
In addition, the complaint filed by the Clear Air Committee was void
because the Clear Air Committee was barred from access to the trial court for failing to
comply with the requirements of Utah's Assumed Name Statute, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 42-2-5 to 42-2-11 (1997). This statute requires that
[e]very person who carries on, conducts, or transacts
business in this state under an assumed name, whether that
business is carried on, conducted, or transacted as an
19

individual, association, partnership, corporation, or
otherwise, shall file with the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code a certificate setting forth: the name under
which the business is, or is to be carried on . . . .
Id. § -5 (emphasis added).5
A penalty barring access to the courts of the state of Utah is imposed on
those who fail to comply with the Assumed Name Statute. The statute provides that a
non-complying party "shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit,
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state. . .
." Id. § -10 (emphasis added); accord Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Upon compliance with Utah's Assumed Name Statute, this
penalty may be removed. WallInv. Co. v. Garden GateDistrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542
(Utah 1979).
Here, the Clear Air Committee failed to file an assumed name registration
with the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code prior to filing suit. R. 93-96. It also did not correct that failure prior to the

5

There is some question whether the Clear Air Committee could even
register its name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. The full
name of the Clear Air Committee is "Residents of Davis County Clear Air
Committee." Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-6.6(6) (1997) provides that "[a] name that
implies by any word in the name that it is an agency of the state or of any of its
political subdivisions, if it is not actually such a legally established agency, may not be
approved for filing by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code." Thus,
inclusion of the words "Davis County" in the name of the Clear Air Committee may be
illegal.
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expiration of the 30-day appeal period following the Administrative Control Board's
denial of the Clear Air Committee's appeal. Id. Consequently, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 42-2-10 (1997), it was barred from filing any action in the trial court within the
relevant appeal time, and its filing was void.
Because the filing of the original complaint by the Clear Air Committee
was void, there was no valid action for which Graham could be substituted as plaintiff.
At most, his "substitution" signaled the commencement of a wholly new action that
began with the substitution. The trial court, therefore, erred when it allowed Graham's
substitution to relate back to the original filing of the complaint by the Clear Air
Committee.
Rules 15(c) and 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not require
a different result because neither deal with a situation where the filing of the original
pleading was void. Indeed, under both it is presumed that the original filing of the
pleading was otherwise valid. Rule 15(c) allows an amendment to relate back to the
date of the original filing if the claims made in the amended pleading arose out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or conduct set forth in the original pleading. Utah R.
Civ. P. 15(c). If the original pleading is void, however, there is nothing to which the
amended pleading may relate back.
Similarly, under Rule 17(a), if an action is commenced in the name of a
party who is not the real party in interest, the action cannot be dismissed until a
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reasonable time is allowed to substitute or join the real party in interest. Again,
however, this rule assumes that a valid action was commenced in the first place.
Furthermore, any substitution of the real party in interest "shall have the
same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a). This rule does not even apply here because the
original complaint in the trial court was filed by and in the name of a real party in
interest—the Clear Air Committee. The Clear Air Committee was the entity that made
the records request to the District and appealed the decision to charge for staff time to
the District's Administrative Control Board. R. 3, 23, 82.6 Thus, it was a real party in
interest, and there was no need to substitute Graham as the plaintiff to name a different
real party in interest.
The only reason substitution was requested was that Graham suddenly
realized—when the District brought it to his attention in the District's Answer—that the
Clear Air Committee could not represent itself in court, and that it had not registered
its name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. Graham did not
seek substitution because the Clear Air Committee was not a real party in interest.
Therefore, Graham cannot rely upon Rule 17(a) for his substitution to relate back to the
date the original complaint was filed.
6

The Assumed Name Statute did not preclude the Clear Air Committee
from participating in administrative proceedings before the District, but it does preclude
the Clear Air Committee's access to the courts.
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Because the filing of the complaint by the Clear Air Committee was void
and Graham's substitution as plaintiff at most commenced a new action, the complaint
should have been dismissed as untimely. The earliest Graham could be considered to
have been substituted as plaintiff was the date of his motion to amend, September 19,
1997, which was well beyond the 30-day appeal period allowed under the District's
GRAMA Ordinance. Ordinance No. 92-C § 11F, Addendum B; see also Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-404 (1997) (establishing 30-day time period for appeal from records
committee decision). The District's Administrative Control Board's decision on the
Clear Air Committee's appeal was complete no later than July 3, 1997. The Court
should rule that Graham's amended complaint was untimely and that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE DISTRICT COULD
CHARGE GRAHAM AND THE CLEAR AIR COMMITTEE FOR STAFF
TIME INCURRED RESPONDING TO THE GRAMA REQUEST
If the Court concludes that the trial court properly considered the merits
of this case, the trial court's ruling on the merits should be affirmed. The trial court
appropriately ruled that the District could charge Graham staff time incurred
responding to the Clear Air Committee's GRAMA request, even though some of the
records requested were not transformed from one medium to another.
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A.

A Common Sense Reading of the Plain Language of Section
63-2-203 Supports the Trial Court's Decision that the District
Can Charge for Staff Time

GRAMA reads, in relevant part, that "[e]very person has the right to
inspect a public record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public record
during normal working hours, subject to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2-204." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-201(1) (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the right to inspect records.
free of charge is expressly made subject to section 63-2-203, which is the section
allowing a governmental entity to charge fees.7 That sections reads:
When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form
other than that normally maintained by the governmental
entity, the actual costs under this section may include the
following:
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing,
compiling, or tailoring the record either into an
organization or media to meet the person's
request;
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval,
and other direct administrative costs for
complying with a request. . . .
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the
result of computer output other than word
processing, the actual incremental cost of
providing the electronic services and products
7

Utah's statute is very different from the Minnesota statute and case law
Graham relies upon. While Utah's statute provides for a right to inspect records free of
charge, it strikes a balance in an effort to protect public entities and public tax monies
by authorizing fees in certain circumstances.
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together with a reasonable portion of the costs
associated with formatting or interfacing the
information for particular users, and the
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections
(2)(a) and (b).
Id. § 63-2-203(2) (emphasis added).
This section further provides that "[t]hose funds shall be used to recover
the actual cost and expenses incurred by the governmental entity in providing the
requested record or record series." Id. § 63-2-203(7)(b). This is consistent with public
records access laws in other jurisdictions. See Hamer v. Lentz, 525 N.E.2d 1045, 1049
(111. App. Ct. 1988) (citing Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid, 493
N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (1986)) (finding that "the court may order the payment by plaintiff
of Nthe reasonable cost of exercising [his] rights.'"); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Griffin, 811 F.2d 644, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating "FOIA generally
requires requesters to pay the costs of searches"); Merrill v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
831 P.2d 634, 642-43 (Okla. 1992) (finding Open Records Act permitted Commission
to charge fees for records request); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A). Furthermore, under
GRAMA " [a] governmental entity may require payment of past fees and future
estimated fees before beginning to process a request if fees are expected to exceed
$50, or if the requester has not paid fees from previous requests." Id. § 63-2-203(8)
(emphasis added). This is all that the District did.
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Graham argues that the Court should adopt an extremely narrow
definition of the term "compile." To adopt Graham's proposal, however, would
completely eviscerate the ability of a political subdivision to recoup costs incurred in
responding to GRAMA requests. "Compile" is not a defined term under GRAMA.
However, it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that a term should be
interpreted and applied in accordance with its usually accepted meaning. Morton Int'l,
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991).
The term "compile" is defined by Webster's New World Dictionary as "to
gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly form" and "to compose (a
book, etc.) of materials gathered from various sources." Webster's New World
Dictionary 290 (2d ed. 1980). The term "form" means, inter alia, "the particular mode
of existence a thing has or takes;" "arrangement; esp. orderly arrangement; way in
which parts of a whole are organized; pattern; style. . . . " Id. at 548. "Record" is a
defined term under GRAMA that means:
all books, letters, documents, papers, maps, plans,
photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data,
or other documentary materials regardless of physical form
or characteristics: (i) which are prepared, owned, received,
or retained by a governmental entity or political subdivision;
and (ii) where all of the information in the original is
reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical or electronic
means.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(18)(a) (1997).
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Thus, the phrase "compiles a record in a form other than that normally
maintained" should be construed to mean to gather and put together all books, letters,
documents, etc. from various sources into an orderly arrangement, but in an
arrangement different than the records are normally kept in District files. That is
precisely what the District did.
This interpretation is consistent with other words used in the same section
of GRAMA. When meaning cannot be ascertained by using the usual meaning of a
term, questionable terms or phrases may be "ascertained by reference to words or
phrases associated with them." Morton, 814 P.2d at 590-91. Here, the words
surrounding the term "compile" include "summarizing, compiling or tailoring the
record either into an organization or media to meet the person's request" and "search,
retrieval, and other direct administrative costs." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2)
(1997).
In this case, the records in question include samples, journals, personal
field notes, inspection logs, and memos and internal documents concerning stack testing
and laboratory analyses. Because of the variety of records involved, the District could
not and did not store them in one document, computer program, or central file.
R. 240. Moreover, the District had to take raw data and organize it in order to respond
to Graham's request. Id.
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The District made a thorough search of all files and records related to the
testing to ensure that the District produced everything relevant. Id. In doing so, it was
necessary for the District to contact those people who may have been involved in that
testing. Id. The District accordingly enlisted the assistance of Jack Schmidt, John
Watson, Bart Baker, and certain operators and maintenance personnel who spent a total
of 14 hours searching, retrieving, and compiling the records that Graham requested.
R. 241.
The District retrieved and compiled information from District files located
at individual employees' work stations, day timers, operator logs, testing protocols,
general District files that may relate to testing, and a computer database. Id. Research
on the computer database was a time-consuming process. The database is continually
updated, and after a period of time, information stored in the database is downloaded to
tape. Some of the information Graham requested had been stored on tape, requiring an
operator to peruse the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the
information Graham requested. Id.
Therefore, to accommodate Graham, it was necessary for the District to
gather, assemble, collect, accumulate, or amass Graham's specific requests into one
place or into a new organization, which created a new record. This new organization
was specifically tailored to meet Graham's request and is in a "form other than that
normally maintained" by the District. Based on the usual meaning of the term
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"compile" and taken in the context of the surrounding language in the GRAMA statute,
the District did "compile[] a record in a form other than that normally maintained by
the governmental entity." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) (1997).
B.

Section 63-2-203 Allows a Charge of Staff Time Even Without a
Request that Records Be Compiled in a Certain Format

Graham's argument that section 63-2-203(2) only allows a governmental
entity to charge a fee for staff time if the requester specifically asks that it be compiled
in a format different from that maintained by the entity is contrary to the plain language
of section 63-2-203. That section specifically allows a governmental entity to charge if
the "governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normally
maintained by the governmental entity. . . . " The section makes no reference to
allowing fees only when the requester asks for the records to be compiled in a different
format, it only references how the entity compiles the records.
Yet, Graham did ask that the records be compiled in a form other than
that normally maintained by the District. As explained above, by the way his requests
were structured, the District had to cull through numerous District files and computer
databases to pull out and compile the records Graham requested. They necessarily
were put together in a different organization than normally maintained by the District
because Graham's requests were specifically directed at only certain documents.
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Therefore, under even Graham's argument, the District would be entitled to charge fees
for staff time.
C.

The Legislative History Does Not Support Graham's
Interpretation

Graham's appeal to the legislative history is similarly unavailing. Graham
cites statements purportedly made by Senator Steele when the language of section
63-2-203(2) was amended in 1994. Senator Steele allegedly stated that the language,
"[w]hen a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normally
maintained by the governmental entity," means that to qualify under section
63-2-203(2) the records cannot be compiled in "the exact same form." Aplt. Br. at 13.
As demonstrated above, using the plain meaning of the words "compile" and "form,"
the records that were retrieved and compiled for Graham were not compiled in "the
exact same form." The District had to gather, assemble, collect, accumulate, and
amass Graham's specific requests into one place or into a new organization specifically
tailored to meet Graham's request. As such, the records as so compiled were in a
"form other than that normally maintained" by the District.
Graham also cites to comments by Senator Steele that the amendments
were intended to have been "taken exactly from the Colorado statute." Aplt. Br.
App. A at 3 (emphasis added). Yet, as Graham admits, the Colorado statute does not
use "exactly" the same wording, and as such, regardless of Senator Steele's supposed
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intent, cannot have the exact same meaning. The Colorado statute Graham cites
requires the governmental entity to perform "a manipulation of data so as to generate
a record in a form not used by the state or by said agency." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 24-72-205(3) (1997) (emphasis added). Nowhere does GRAMA require "a
manipulation of data" or that a governmental entity put the record "in a form not used
by the . . . agency." "Manipulating data" into a format entirely foreign to the
governmental entity is very different from simply compiling a record in a form not
normally maintained by the governmental entity. Therefore, the Colorado statute does
not support Graham's position.
D.

Public Policy Favors Protecting Governmental Entities from
Abusive Records Requests So Long as Public Access Is Not
Denied

Graham's public policy argument also fails. Under the District's
interpretation, broad public access is still available and First Amendment rights are
protected, but a balance is struck to protect public coffers from abusive requests.
Records requesters could tie up government operations needlessly if they only have to
pay staff time for compilation when they specifically ask for the records to be put in
different media than the records are maintained by governmental entities.
Governmental entities should be allowed to charge staff time compilation costs to
protect our tax dollars from abusive requests. Allowing governmental entities to do
this would not hamper access to records, but would encourage records requesters to
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draft their requests narrowly so as to not overburden state and local government.
Records requesters will still have their records, and our local governments will still be
able to carry out their functions and also protect our tax dollars.
For simple compilations of records, GRAMA provides its own protection
of public access because it does not allow governmental entities to charge for the first
15 minutes of staff time attributable to compiling the record. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-2-203(2)(b) (1997) ("no charge may be made for the first quarter hour of staff
time").8 Thus, if a search of several different sources or for a single record does not
take more than 15 minutes, the requester does not have to pay administrative costs.
The vast majority of GRAMA requests handled by the District fall into this category.
Yet, if a records request requires complicated searching and retrieval, our tax dollars
are protected by the requirement that the requester pay certain costs.
E.

The District's GRAMA Ordinance Allows Charging Graham
for the Staff Time Incurred

The Utah legislature has authorized each political subdivision to "adopt an
ordinance or a policy applicable throughout its jurisdiction relating to information
practices including classification, designation, access, denials, segregation, appeals,
management, retention, and amendment of records." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-701 (l)(a)
(1997). On June 10, 1992, the District adopted Ordinance No. 92-C (the
8

The District will not charge Graham for the first 15 minutes it spent
compiling the records he requested. This will reduce the charge to $275.
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"Ordinance"), which is a policy that sets forth, among other things, the District's
response procedures pertinent to a records request as well as the applicable fees.
Ordinance No. 92-C at 9-11, §§ 9, 10, Addendum B.
Pursuant to the Ordinance, the District's fee schedule is as follows:
1.

Reviewing a record to determine whether it is subject to
disclosure . . . No charge

2.

Inspection of record by requesting person . . . No charge

3.

Copy Fees . . . 25 cents per page

4.

Computer Disk . . . $5.00 (Plus overhead and time of District staff
in preparation of information request billed at the rate of $20.00
per hour)

5.

Other Forms . . . Actual cost (Minimum $5.00 plus overhead and
time of District staff in preparation of information request billed at
the rate of $20.00 per hour.)

6.

Miscellaneous Fees . . . Actual cost (Minimum $5.00 plus
overhead and time of District staff in preparation of information
request billed at the rate of $20.00 per hour.)

Ordinance No. 92-C at 10-11, § 10, Addendum B.
The fees the District charged Graham are in accordance with GRAMA
and the Ordinance. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203 (1997); Ordinance No. 92-C at 10-11,
§10. The $280 fee assessed by the District is based on the 14 actual hours expended
for the several searches by District staff. R. 241. In compliance with GRAMA and the
District's Ordinance, Graham was not charged for time incurred in reviewing the
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records to determine whether they were private, controlled, or protected under
GRAMA, although a review of the records Graham requested was made to make such a
determination. Id. Graham also will not be charged for inspecting the records, only
for the retrieval and compilation of the records, as set forth above.
The fees the District charged Graham were reasonable. Staff time
charges assessed by the District on Graham's records request were based on the
Ordinance, but were less than actual costs. Id.; see Merrill v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
831 P.2d 634, 642-43 (Okla. 1992) (finding charges of $350 for a microfiche copy and
$258 for a computer tape copy, which included labor and administrative costs, not
unreasonable under Oklahoma's Open Records Act). Recently, the District paid a
federal agency $25 per hour for staff time incurred by that agency responding to a
FOIA request. R. 241.
The District's charges were proper under GRAMA and the District's
GRAMA Ordinance. The Court should affirm the trial court on this issue.

in.
GRAHAM IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES OR COSTS
GRAMA provides that the Court may, in its discretion, award attorney
fees and costs incurred in a judicial appeal "of a denial of a records request if the
requester substantially prevails." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802(2)(a) (1997). In making

34

its decision, the Court is required to consider "the public benefit derived from the case;
the nature of the requester's interest in the records; and whether the governmental
entity's or political subdivision's actions had a reasonable basis." Id. § 63-2-802(b).
Because the District, not Graham, is entitled to judgment, Graham is not entitled to the
fees and costs he seeks.
If Graham prevails on this appeal, the Court should not order that Graham
be awarded fees on remand. The trial court's carefully reasoned opinion, agreeing with
the District's position on the fees charged, demonstrates that the District's actions had
more than a reasonable basis. The remaining issues that must be addressed to
determine whether fees should be assessed are factual inquiries that should be left to the
trial court for determination. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah
1998) (attorney fees for prevailing party on appeal remanded to trial court for
determination).
In any event, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802(5) (1997) provides that claims
for attorneys' fees under GRAMA are subject to the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Presumably, that means after prevailing, if he does,
Graham would have to follow the procedural requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act before he could be entitled to recover. Such cannot be accomplished
during the course of this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should rule that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the merits of this case because the filing of the original complaint by the Clear Air
Committee was void, and the substitution of Graham as plaintiff was untimely. If the
Court concludes that the trial court properly reached the merits of this case, the Court
should affirm the trial court's decision on the merits in all respects.
DATED this 19th day of October, 1998.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Attoi
Appellees/Cross-Appellants/Defendants
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Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name - Contents Execution - Filing.
(1) Every person who carries on, conducts, or transacts
business in this state under an assumed name, whether that
business is carried on, conducted, or transacted as an
individual, association, partnership, corporation, or
otherwise, shall file with the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code a certificate setting forth:
(a) the name under which the business is, or is to be
carried on, conducted, or transacted, and the full true
name, or names, of the person owning, and the
person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the
business;
(b) the location of the principal place of business,
and the street address of the person.
(2) The certificate shall be executed by the person owning,
and the person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the
business, and shall be filed not later than 30 days after the
time of commencing to carry on, conduct, or transact the
business.
(3) "Filed" means the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code has received and approved, as to form, a
document submitted under the provisions of this chapter,
and has marked on the face of the document a stamp or seal
indicating the time of day and date of approval, the name of
the division, the division director's signature and division
seal, or facsimiles of the signature or seal.

Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10. Penalties.
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business
under an assumed name without having complied with the
provisions of this chapter, and until the provisions of this
chapter are complied with:
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action,
suit, counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in
any of the courts of this state; and
(2) may be subject to a penalty in the form of a late
filing fee determined by the division director in an
amount not to exceed three times the fees charged
under Section 42-2-7 and established under Section
63-38-3.2.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of records.
(1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record
free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public
record during normal working hours, subject to Sections
63-2-203 and 63-2-204.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203. Fees.

(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form
other than that normally maintained by the governmental
entity, the actual costs under this section may include the
following:
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling,
or tailoring the record either into an organization or
media to meet the person's request;
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and
other direct administrative costs for complying with a
request. The hourly charge may not exceed the salary
of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of
the custodian of records, has the necessary skill and
training to perform the request; provided, however,
that no charge may be made for the first quarter hour
of staff time; and
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the
result of computer output other than word
processing, the actual incremental cost of
providing the electronic services and products
together with a reasonable portion of the costs
associated with formatting or interfacing the
information for particular users, and the

3

administrative costs as set forth in Subsections
(2)(a) and (b).

(7)(b) Those funds shall be used to recover the actual cost
and expenses incurred by the governmental entity in
providing the requested record or record series.
(8) A governmental entity may require payment of past fees
and future estimated fees before beginning to process a
request if fees are expected to exceed $50, or if the
requester has not paid fees from previous requests. Any
prepaid amount in excess of fees due shall be returned to the
requester.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802. Injunction - Attorneys1 fees.

(2)(a) A district court may assess against any governmental
entity or political subdivision reasonable attorneys' fees and
other litigation costs reasonably incurred in connection with
a judicial appeal of a denial of a records request if the
requester substantially prevails.
(b) In determining whether to award attorneys' fees under
this section, the court shall consider:
(i) the public benefit derived from the case;
(ii) the nature of the requester's interest in the
records; and
(iii) whether the governmental entity's or political
subdivision's actions had a reasonable basis.

4

(c) Attorneys' fees shall not ordinarily be awarded if the
purpose of the litigation is primarily to benefit the
requester's financial or commercial interest.
(3) Neither attorneys' fees nor costs shall be awarded for
fees or costs incurred during administrative proceedings.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), a court may only award
fees and costs incurred in connection with appeals to district
courts under Subsection 63-2-404(2) if the fees and costs
were incurred 20 or more days after the requester provided
to the governmental entity or political subdivision a
statement of position that adequately explains the basis for
the requester's position.
(5) Claims for attorneys' fees as provided in this section or
for damages are subject to Title 63, Chapter 30,
Governmental Immunity Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40. Corporations and associations forbidden to practice Exceptions.
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary
association, except such as are organized for benevolent or
charitable purposes, or organizations approved by the
Supreme Court and formed for the purpose of assisting
persons without means in the pursuit of civil remedies, to
hold itself out to the public by advertisement or otherwise as
being entitled to practice law or to furnish attorneys or
counselors, or to render legal services or advice of any kind
in any action or proceeding, or to solicit directly or
indirectly any claim or demand for the purpose of bringing
action thereon. Any corporation or voluntary association
violating any of the provisions of this section is liable to a
fine of not more than $5,000; and every officer, agent or
employee of such corporation or voluntary association who
directly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corporation
or voluntary association in any of the acts herein prohibited,
or assists such corporation or voluntary association to do
5

such prohibited acts, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact
that such officer, agent or employee is a duly and regularly
licensed attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow
any such corporation or voluntary association to do the acts
prohibited herein, nor shall such fact be a defense upon the
trial of any of the persons mentioned herein for a violation
of the provisions of this section.

6

Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Amended and supplemental pleadings.

(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure- Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a
contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized
by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an
action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the
state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time
has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

7

Addendum B

ORDINANCE NO. 92-C
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING A POLICY RELATING
TO
INFORMATION
PRACTICES
INCLUDING
CLASSIFICATION,
DESIGNATION,
ACCESS,
DENIALS,
SEGREGATION,
APPEALS,
MANAGEMENT, RETENTION AND AMENDMENT OF
RECORDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH "GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS
AND MANAGEMENT ACT" AND PROVIDING FOR AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.
STTMM1HT rrP ORDINANCE

This Ordinance adopts a policy relating to information
practices

including

denials, segregation,

classification,

designation,

access,

appeals, management, retention and

amendment of records in accordance with provisions of the Utah
Government Records Access and management Act" and provides for
an effective date for such Ordinance.
DATED this ir* day of June, 1992.
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
AND ENERGY RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT
By:
ROBERT W. ARBUCKLE
Chairman
Administrative Control Board
ATTEST:

GAYLE A. STEVENSON
Secretary
Date of P u b l i c a t i o n :
XIN6
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ORDINANCE HO- 92-C
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING A POLICY RELATING
TO
INFORMATION
PRACTICES
INCLUDING
CLASSIFICATION,
DESIGNATION, ACCESS,
DENIALS,
SEGREGATION,
APPEALS,
MANAGEMENT, RETENTION AND AMENDMENT OF
RECORDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH "GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS
AND MANAGEMENT ACT" AND PROVIDING FOR AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.

WHEREAS, the Utah State Legislature has adopted the
"Government Records Access and Management Act", hereinafter
sometimes referred to as "GRAMA" or the "Act"; and,
WHEREAS, it is the intent of GRAMA, inter alia,

to

establish fair and reasonable records management practices in
accordance with the requirements of said Act; and,
WHEREAS, GRAMA permits each political subdivision to
adopt a policy relating to information practices subject to
the requirements of the said Act; and/
WHEREAS, the Davis County Solid Waste Management and
Energy Recovery Special Service District (District) does now
find that it is both necessary and desirable to adopt fair and
reasonable records management practices for the District in
accordance with and as required by the said Act,
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROL BOARD OF THE DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND
ENERGY RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT, a public body of the
State of Utah, as follows, to-wit:
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Section 1 - General Purpose
A.

The Davis County Solid Waste Management
and Energy Recovery Special Service
District (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as the "District") adopts this policy
to
establish
guidelines
for
open
government information recognizing the
need to maintain and preserve accurate
records, provide public access to public
records and preserve the right of privacy
of personal data collected or received by
the District.

Section 2 - District Policy
A.

In adopting this policy# the District
recognizes the enactment of Government
Records Access and Management Act by the
Utah State Legislature (Sections 63-2-101
et seq,, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) and
the application of that Act to the
District records. The purpose of these
policies is to conform to Section 63-2701 which provides that each political
subdivision may adopt an ordinance or a
policy relating to information practices
including classification, designation,
access, denials, segregation, appeals,
management, retention and amendment of
records. The intent of this policy is to
provide modifications to the general
provisions of State law, where allowed,
to meet the public needs, operation,
management capabilities and resources of
the District,

Section 3 - Compliance with State Law
A.

in adopting this policy, the District
recognizes the following sections of the
Government Records Access and Management
Act apply to the District and adopts by
reference such provisions as part of this
policy.
Any inconsistency or conflict
between this policy and the following
referenced statutes, where discretion is
not allowed by the statute, shall be
governed by the statute•
2
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Part 1

General Provisions
S63-2-101
§63-2-102
§63-2-103
S63-2-104
§63-2-105

Part 2

Access to Records
S63-2-201
563-2-202
§63-2-205
S63-2-206

Part 3

Right to inspect records
and receive copies of
Access
to
private,
controlled and protected
documents
Denials
Sharing records

Classification
§63-2-301
SS3-2-302
§63-2-303
S63-2-304
S63-2-305
S63-2-306
§63-2-307
S63-2-308

Records that must be
disclosed
Private records
Controlled records
Protected records
Procedure to determine
classification
Duty to evaluate records
and make designations and
classifications
Segregation of records
Business confidentiality
claims

Part 4

[NOT APPLICABLE]

Part 5

[NOT APPLICABLE]

Part: 6

Accuracy of Records
S63-2-601
§63-2-602

e m »*nn Rfc

Short title
Legislative intent
Definitions
Administrative Procedures
Act not applicable
Confidentiality
agreements
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Rights of individuals on
whom data is maintained
Disclosure to subject of
records - Context of use
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Part 7

Applicability to Political Subdivisions:
The Judiciary and the Legislature
S63-2-701

Part 8

Remedies
§63-2-801
§63-2-802
S63-2-803
S63-2-804

Part 9

Criminal penalties
Injunction - Attorneys'
Pees

No l i a b i l i t y for certain
decisions
of
a
governmental entity
Disciplinary action

Archives and Records Service
S63-2-905
S63-2-907

Part 10

Political subdivisions to
enact
ordinances
in
compliance with chapter

Records declared property
of the State Right to replevin

Other
SS3-30-1G.6

Attorneysr
fees
records request

for

Section 4 - Definitions
As used in this ordinance, the following definitions
shall be applicable.

STO-'SOOIB

A.

"Act" shall refer to the Government Records Access
and Management Act, SS63-2-1, et seq., Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

B.

"District" shall refer to the Davis County Solid
Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special
Service District.

C.

"Computer software program" means the series of
instructions
or
statements
that
permit
the
functioning of a computer system in a manner
designed to provide
storage, . retrieval, and
manipulation of data from the computer system, and
any associated documentation, manuals, or other
source material eacplaining how to operate the
software program. "Software" does not include the
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original data or record which is manipulated by the
software,
"Controlled" records shall be those defined as
controlled under the provisions of the Act,
"Data" shall refer to individual entries (for
example, birth date, address, etc.) in records.
"Dispose" means to destroy, or render irretrievable
or illegible, a record or the information contained
in it by any physical, electronic, or other means,
including unauthorized deletion or erasure of
electronically recorded audio, visual, non-written
formats, data processing, or other records•
"Non-public" records shall refer to those records
defined as private, controlled, or protected under
the provisions of the Act.
•'Private" records shall refer to those records
classified as private under the provisions of the
Act.
"Protected" records shall refer to those records
classified as protected under the provisions of the
Act.
"Public" records shall refer to those records which
have not been classified as non-public in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
(1) "Record" means all books, letters, documents,
papers, maps, plans, photographs, films, cards,
tapes, recordings, or other documentary materials,
and electronic data regardless of physical form or
characteristics, prepared, owned, used, received,
or retained by the District where all the
information in the original is reproducible by some
mechanical, electronic, photographic or other
means.
(2)

"Record" does not mean:
(a) Temporary drafts
prepared for the
use or prepared by
personal use of a
working;

or similar materials
originator's personal
the originator for the
person for whom he is

5
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(b)

Materials that are legally owned by an
individual in his private capacity;

(c)

Materials to which access is limited by
the laws of copyright or patent;

(d)

Junk mail or commercial publications
received by the District or by an officer
or employee of the District;

(e)

Personal
notes
or
daily
calendars
prepared by any District employee for
personal use or the personal use of a
supervisor or such notes, calendars or
internal memoranda prepared for the use
of an officer or agency acting in a
quasi-judicial or deliberative process or
pursuant to matters discussed in a
meeting closed pursuant to Utah Open
Meetings Act; or

(f)

Proprietary computer software programs as
defined in subsection C. above that are
developed or purchased by or for the
District for its own use.

Section 5 - Public Right to Records
A*

Members of the public shall have the right to see,
review, examine and take copies, in any format
maintained by the District, of all District
governmental records defined as "public" under the
provisions of this Policy, upon the payment of the
lawful fee and pursuant to the provisions of this
Policy and the Act.

B.

The District has no obligation to create a record
or record series in response to a request from a
member of the public, if the record requested is
not otherwise regularly maintained or kept.

C.

When a record is temporarily held by a custodial
District
agency, pursuant
to that
custodial
agency's statutory functions, such as records
storage, investigation, litigation or audit, the
record shall not be considered a record of the
custodial agency for the purposes of this Policy.
The record shall be considered a record of the
District and any requests for access to such
6
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records shall be directed to the District, rather
than the custodial agency, pursuant to these
procedures.
D.

Original documents shall not leave the custody of
the District. Document inspection will occur in
the conference area of the administrative office
building or such other area designated by the
Records Officer.
Private citizens will not be
allowed in the vault where original documents are
maintained. The appropriate documents and/or files
given to the individual will be accounted for
subsequent to the individual's inspection and prior
to his/her departure from the District offices.

Section 6 - Public, Private, Controlled and Protected
Records
A.

Public records shall be all those District records
that are not private, controlled, or protected and
that are not exempt from disclosure as provided in
subsection 63-2-201(3)(b) of the ActPublic
records shall be made available to any person. All
District records are considered public unless they
are (1) expressly designated, classified, or
defined otherwise by the District in accordance
with policies and procedures established by this
Policy, (2) are so designated, classified or
defined by the Act, or (3) are made non-public by
other applicable law.

B.

Private records shall be those District records
classified as "private", as defined in the Act S632-302 (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) and as designated,
classified, or defined in procedures established
pursuant to this Policy* Private records shall be
made available to the following persons:
The
subject of the record, the parent or legal guardian
of a minor who ia the subject of the record, the
legal guardian of an incapacitated individual who
is the subject of the record, any person who has a
power of attorney or a notarized release from the
subject of the record or his legal representative,
or any person possessed of and serving a
legislative subpoena or a court order issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction.

C.

Controlled records shall be those District records
classified as "controlled", as defined in the Act,
7
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§63-2-303 (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) and as
designated, classified, or defined in procedures
established in this Policy,
Controlled records
shall be
made
available
to
a physician,
psychologist, or licensed social worker who submits
a notarized release from the subject of the record
or any person presenting a legislative subpoena or
a court order issued by a court of competent
j uris diction.
D«

Protected records shall be those District records
classified as "protected" as defined in the Act,
§63-2-304 (U.C.A,, 1953, as amended) and as
designated, classified or defined in procedures
established in this Policy.
Protected records
shall be made available to the person who submitted
the information in the record, to a person who has
power of attorney or notarized release from any
persons or governmental entities whose interests
are protected by the classification of the record,
or to any person presenting a legislative subpoena
or a court order regarding the release of the
information and issued by a court or competent
jurisdiction.

Section 7 - Privacy Rights
A.

The District recognizes and upholds the personal
right of privacy retained by persons who may be the
subject of governmental records.

B.

The District may, as determined appropriate by the
District Executive Director, notify the subject of
a record that a request for access to the subject's
record has been made.

C.

The District may require that the requester of
records provide a written release, notarized within
thirty (30) days before the request, from the
subject of the records in question before access to
such records is provided.

Section B - Designation, Classification and Retention
A*

All District records and records series, of any
format, shall be designated, classified and
scheduled for retention according to the provisions
of the Act and this Policy. Any records or record
series generated in the future shall also be so
8
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designated, classified and scheduled for retention.
Records designation classification and scheduling
for retention shall be conducted under the
supervision of the District Executive Director.
Section 9 - Procedures for Records Request
A.

Under circumstances in which a District is not able
to respond immediately to a records request, the
requester shall fill out and present to the
District a written request on forms provided by the
District. The date and time of the request shall
be noted on the written request form and all time
frames provided under this Policy shall commence
from that time and date. Requesters of non-public
information shall adequately identify themselves
and their status prior to receiving access to nonpublic records.

B.

The District
by approving
denying the
response as
procedures.

C.

(1) In most circumstances and excepting those
eventualities set out below, the District shall
respond to a written request for a public record
within ten business days "after that request.

may respond to a request for a record
the request and providing the records,
request, or such other appropriate
may be established by policies and

(2) Extraordinary circumstances shall justify the
District's failure to respond to a written request
for a public record within ten business days and
shall extend the time for response thereto to that
time reasonably necessary to respond to the
request, as determined by the District Executive
Director.
Extraordinary
circumstances
shall
include/ but not be limited to, the following:
(a)

Some other governmental entity is currently
and actively using the record requested;

(b)

The record
requested
is for either a
voluminous quantity of records or requires the
District to review a large jiumber of records
or perform extensive research to locate the
materials requested;

9
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(c)

The District is currently processing either a
large number of records requests or is subject
to extraordinary work loads in the processing
of other work;

(d)

The request involves an analysis of legal
issues to determine the proper response to the
request;

(e)

The request involves extensive editing to
separate public data in a record from that
data which is not public; or

(f)

Providing the information request requires
computer
programming
or
other
format
manipulation •

(3) When a record request cannot be responded to
within ten (10) business days, the District Records
Officer shall give the requester an estimate of the
time required to respond to the request.
Such
estimate may be given at any time within the ten
(10) day period*
D.

The failure or inability of the District to respond
to a request for a record within the time frames
set out herein, or the District's denial of such a
request, shall give the requester the right to
appeal as provided in Section 11.

Section 10 - Fees
A.

Applicable fees for the processing of information
requests under this Policy shall generally be set
at actual cost or as otherwise established by
policies adopted under this Policy, The District
will charge the following fees for requests
relating to the Government Records Access and
Management Act.

1.

Reviewing a record to determine
whether it is subject to disclosure

No charge

Inspection of record by
requesting person

No charge

2.
3.

Copy Fees

•

25 cents per page

10
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4.

ComputerDisk. ..

•
•
....$5.00
(P lus
overhead
and
time of District staff in
preparation of information
request billed at the rate
of $20.00 per hour)

5.

Other Forms

Actual cost
(Minimum
$5.00
plus
overhead and time of
District
staff
in
preparation of information
request billed at the rate
of $20.00 per hour.)

6.

Miscellaneous Fees

Actual cost
(Minimum $5.00 plus
overhead and time of
District staff in
preparation of information
request billed at the rate
of $20,00 per hour.)

Section 11 - Appeal Process
A.

Any person aggrieved by the District's denial or
claim of extraordinary circumstances may appeal the
determination within thirty calendar (30) days
after notice of the District's action to the
District Executive Director by filing a written
notice of appeal.
The notice of appeal shall
contain the petitioner's name, address, phone
number, relief sought and if petitioner desires, a
short statement of the facts, reasons and legal
authority for the appeal.

B.

If the appeal involves a record that is subject to
business confidentiality or affects the privacy
rights of an individual or person, the District
Executive Director shall send a notice of the
requester's appeal to the affected individual or
person.

C.

The District Executive Director shall make a
determination on the appeal within thirty b\ siness
(30) days after receipt of the appeal. During this
30 day period the District Executive Director may
schedule an informal hearing or request any
additional information deemed necessary to make a
determination.
The District Executive Director
11
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shall send written notice to the appellant and any
affected person or individual providing the reasons
for
the
District
Executive
Director's
determination.
D.

In addition, if the District
affirms the denial in whole or
shall include a statement that
right to appeal the denial
Administrative Control Board
calendar days.

Executive Director
in part, the denial
the requester has a
to the District's
within thirty (30)

E,

The person may file a written notice of appeal to
the Administrative Control Board to be heard at the
next scheduled meeting of the Board, If there is
no meeting scheduled in the next thirty (30)
calendar days the Administrative Control Board
shall schedule a special meeting for the purpose of
hearing the appeal.
The final decision of the
Administrative Control Board shall be by majority
vote of a quorum of the Board. The Board shall
prepare a written decision outlining its final
determination
and
reasons
for
the
final
determination.

P.

If the Administrative Control Board affirms the
denial, in whole or in partf the person may
petition for judicial review in District Court as
provided in S63-2-404, U.C.A., 1953.

Section 12 - Reasonable Accommodation
A.

Reasonable accommodations regarding access to
governmental records shall be provided to persons
with disabilities in accordance with the Americans
with Disabilities Act upon request of the
applicant.

Section 13 - Records Amendments
A,

Government records held by the District may be
amended or corrected as needed.
Requests for
amendments, corrections, or other changes shall be
made in writing to the District having custody of
the records and setting forth, wirn specificity,
the amendment or correction requested. When an
amendment or correction of a government record is
made, both the original record and the amended or
12
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corrected record shall be retained, unless provided
otherwise by the Act or other State or Federal law.
Section 14 - Penalties
A.

District employees who knowingly refuse to permit
access to records in accordance with the Act and
this Policy, who knowingly permit access to nonpublic
records, or who
knowingly, without
authorization or legal authority, dispose of,
alter, or remove records or allow other persons to
do so in violation of the provisions of the Act,
this Policy or other law or regulation may be
subject to criminal prosecution in accordance'with
the Act and disciplinary action, including
termination of employment,

B.

In accordance with the Act, neither the District
nor any of its officers or employees shall be
liable for damages resulting from the release of a
record where the requester presented evidence of
authority to obtain the record, even if it may be
subsequently determined that the requester had no
such authority.

Section 15 - Records Officer
A,

The District Office Secretary is appointed to
coordinate records access, management and archives
activities and shall make annual reports of records
services activities to the Executive Director who
shall make an annual report of such activities to
the Administrative Control Board.

Section 16 - Records Maintenance
A.

Records maintenance procedures shall be developed
to ensure that due care is taken to maintain and
preserve District records safely and accurately
over the long term.
The District Executive
Director shall be responsible for monitoring the
application and use of technical processes in the
creation, duplication, and disposal of District
records.
He/she shall monitor compliance with
required standards of quality, . permanence, and
admissibility pertaining to the creation, use, and
maintenance of records.

13
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B.

All District records shall remain the property of
the District unless federal or state legal
authority provides otherwise. Property rights to
District records may not be permanently transferred
from the District to any private individual or
entity, including those legally disposable obsolete
District records.
This prohibition does not
include the providing of copies of District records
otherwise produced for release or distribution
under this chapter.

C.

Custodians of any District records shallf at the
expiration of their terms of office, appointment or
employment, deliver custody and control of all
records kept or received by them to their
successors, supervisors/
or to the District
Executive Director*

Section 17 - Effective Date
This Ordinance shall become effective July 1, 1992
provided that prior to such time a copy of this Ordinance
shall be deposited in the District Offices and a short Summary
published in a newspaper published within the District.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this

IVtf* day of June, 1992,

DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
AND ENERGY RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT
By: —-TUyJi
KV^Kjy/?,
ROBERT W. ARBUCKLE
Chairman
ATTEST:

GAYLE
Secretary

B:GramaOrd
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS CQUNTYL1 -, P i >Q7
l uv l 0
4 l o :l
STATE OF UTAH
'
' Ji

>JtfUl_

MARK E. GRAHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT, THE DISTRICTS
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BOARD,
and LEGRAND BITTER, THE DISTRICTS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
Defendants.

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS
MOTION TO AMEND and
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 970700320

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs and Defendants1 respective Notices to
Submit on their (respective) motions. The Court has reviewed the parties' pleadings, as well
as the applicable law on the issues raised in those pleadings. Having done so, and now being
fully advised, the Court hereby rules as follows:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion to Amend
Utah Rules of Civ. Pro. Rule 15(a) states in full:
Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders.

Pursuant to these rules, after the time for an amended pleading of right has passed,
there are only two ways that an amendment to a pleading may be made: by leave of court, or
by written consent of the other party. There was no consent by the other party, so the only
way that this amended pleading may be allowed in would be by leave of court. The Utah
Supreme Court, while recognizing such matters are within the sound discretion of the trial
court, stated that "Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting of
leave to amend" Westlev v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983).
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
Defendants' motion to dismiss seeks dismissal based on evidence outside of the
pleadings. Once matters outside the pleadings are presented to the Court and are not
excluded by the Court, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment. Lind v.
Lynck 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983) [quoting Rule 12(b)(6)].
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing the Court notes that summary judgment is
appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743. 854
P.2d 513, 514-515 (Utah 1993): see also Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272,
1274 (Utah 1993). Moreover, in considering a motion for summary judgement, the Court
must examine the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment." Hunt v. Hurst 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990).
Procedural History
A brief recital of the procedural history of this case is necessary to frame the Court's
substantive ruling:
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1.

That this action was initially brought in the name of "Residents of Davis

County Clear Air Committee, a non-profit organization (the "Committee") on July 30, 1997.
Mark E. Graham ("Graham") lists himself as the individual actually filing the complaint,
purporting to represent the committee in a pro-se capacity;
2.

That plaintiff Graham, on September 19, 1997, moved the Court to allow

amendment of the complaint, such amendment substituting Graham's name in place of the
Committee as plaintiff. The motion was accompanied by a ?rNotice of Motion for Leave tcr
File Amended Complaint, the proposed Amended Complaint, and an order granting leave to
amend the complaint. The motion encompassed a certificate of service to counsel for
defendants, and the ,fNotice of Motion" also apparently sought to apprise defendants of
plaintiffs pending motion to amend;
3.

That no response having being filed within the 10-day statutory period, the

Court's clerk inadvertently placed the motion to amend before the Court for decision
September 29, 1997. At that time, there had been no notice to submit filed, as required by
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court, believing the motion to have
been properly submitted and no objection having been received at that juncture, signed
plaintiffs order granting him leave to amend October 3, 1997;
4.

The same day, October 3, 1997, defendants filed their (current) motion to

dismiss or for summary judgment, supported by a "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to File an Amended Complaint and in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or
for Summary Judgment;
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5.

That on October 14, 1997 plaintiff Graham filed with the Court a notice to

submit on the motion to amend, which notice stated "the motion to file an amended complaint
is fully briefed, including the attached memorandum filed on this date, and is ready for
decision." Also filed by plaintiff Graham that same day were his "Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffs Motion to File an Amended Complaint, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment;" his "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment" (referencing the other memorandum filed that
day); and his "Motion to Remand Case to District's Executive Director With Instructions."
6.

That on October 27, 1997 defendants filed with the Court their "Reply

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to File an Amended Complaint and in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
LFGAL ARGUMENTS AND RULING
In this action, plaintiff requests judicial review of the defendants' decision to require
payment before release of records sought under GRAMA1 Plaintiffs Committee and Graham
sought release of records involving air pollution release tests from defendants. Apparently,
defendants prepared the requested records, but will not allow review or release of the records
until such time as plaintiffs) pay the requested fees. The issue before the Court at present
however, is plaintiffs) capacity to bring this suit at all. Essentially, defendants argue that the
action must be dismissed and Graham must not be allowed to be substituted as plaintiff in an
amended complaint because: 1. The initial filing of the lawsuit is void because Graham, a

1

As far as the Court can tell by the pleadings submitted, this already somewhat
protracted (and probably expensive) litigation stems entirely from defendants1 $280.00 request.
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non-attorney, filed the suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the Committee; 2. The
initial filing of the lawsuit in the name of the Committee is void because the Committee
failed to comply with the Utah Assumed Name Statutes (especially UCA § 42-2-10); 3. The
Committee, as the entity having administratively dealt with defendants, is the only proper
party-plaintiff; and 4. Even if Graham were substituted as plaintiff, his claims do not relate
back, and as such they are now time-barred
With respect to the defendants' arguments, the Court finds:
Pro-Se Representation
It is clear that in Utah, a non-attorney may not represent anyone but him/her self in a
court of law. Tracy-Burke v. Dept. of Employment Security. 699 P.2d 687, 688 (1985) (per
curiam) fquoting Turtle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Association. 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616
(I960)). (See also, UCA § 78-51-25) In filing this case, Graham, a non-attorney, attempted
to represent the Committee in a pro-se capacity. Defendants argue that doing so rendered the
filing of this lawsuit void ab initio. As support, they cite a California case, Paradise v.
NowlirL2 which held that an appellate brief filed by an individual representing a corporation
in propria persona was void and without effect. The Tracy-Burke case, although it cites
language from Paradise, does not, as defendants argue, stand for the proposition that this
lawsuit is void ab initio. It simply held that the petition for review must be dismissed, as it
stood in front of that Court, because of the improper representation. The issue of whether the
initial filing of the petition was void was not addressed in that case, and has never been

2

195 P.2d 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
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addressed by Utah's appellate courts. It is this Court's opinion that the circumstances of this
case, in that plaintiff timely requested an amendment to conform with the rules as soon as he
was notified of the error, would argue against dismissal on such grounds.
Violation of Utah's Assumed Name Statutes
UCA § 42-2-10 states, in relevant part, that:
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this chapter, and
until the provisions of this chapter are complied with:
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit,
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts
of this state; and
The Court is not entirely convinced that a community association allegedly organized
for the purposes of monitoring pollution compliance is carrying on, conducting, or transacting
business such to put it within the purview of the above-cited statute. A search of Utah cases
reveals little on the issue that would be helpful to the Court. Nevertheless, even assuming
defendants' position to be meritorious on this point, the Courts position with respect to the
pro-se representation issue would apply equally to this issue to preclude dismissal. Plaintiffs
timely request to amend the complaint would serve to remedy any error that may have arisen
as a result of its filing under an improperly registered assumed name.
Committee Only Proper Party-Plaintiff
On this issue, the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact precluding
summary judgment It is plainly apparent from the filed communications between the parties
that even defendants themselves were somewhat confused as to whether they were dealing
with the Committee or with Graham. Mich, if not all, of the correspondence from defendants
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concerning the underlying issue in this case is addressed to Graham, in his personal capacity,
rather than to the Committee. Such correspondence is often, but apparently not on every
occasion, in response to Graham's correspondence stating that he was acting in behalf of the
Committee.
The Court finds (below) that there is no evidence that there is not an identity of
interest between Graham and the Committee. Furthermore, in none of the communications
between the parties was there ever (as far as the evidence before the Court shows) an issue
raised by defendants as to whether Graham or the Committee were administratively
proceeding in an improper manner. Such findings, if unrebutted by further evidence, would
surely raise substantial issues of estoppel against defendants1 use of this argument.
No Relation Back
Rule 15(c), U.RCiv.P. reads as follows:
Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.
Utah Courts have had various occasions to interpret this language, and the most
common feeling among the Courts, with respect to the substitution or addition of new parties,
is that the parties sought to be substituted or added must have an "identity of interest" with
the originally named parties. See, e.g., Wilcox, 911 P.2 367 (Utah 1996); Vina v. Jefferson
Ins. Co.. 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Peny v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681
P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984); and Doxey-Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976).
The general rule relating to the application of Rule 15(c) was set forth in Doxey-LaytorL 548
P.2dat906. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
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Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not apply to an amendment which
substitutes or adds new parties for those brought before the court by the
original pleadings - whether plaintiff or defendant. This for the reason that
such would amount to the assertion of a new cause of action, and if such were
allowed to relate back to the filing of the complaint, the purpose of a statute of
limitation would be defeated.
There is an exception to the is rule. The exception operates where there
is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties
have an identity of interest; so it can assumed or proved the relation back is
not prejudicial. The rational underpinning this exception is one which obstructs
a mechanical use of the statute of limitations: to prevent adjudication of a
claim. Such is particularly valid where, as here, the real parties in interest
were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them
unofficially, from an early stage.
Id., at 906. (emphasis added). Defendants vigorously attempt to show that there is no
identity of interest between the Committee and Graham. Such arguments hardly persuade the
Court. As set forth above, there is no evidence in front of the Court that Graham's interests
in this matter are not substantially the same, if not identical, to those of the Committee. On
the other hand, there is ample evidence that "the real parties in interest were sufficiently
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early stage,"
weighing in favor of relation back.3

CONCLUSION
Based on the above findings and conclusions of law, the Court finds that, in the
interests of justice, and with the policies of Rule 15 in mind, that plaintiff Graham's Motion
to Amend should be granted and his claims shall be allowed to relate back to the time of the
filing of the action.

3

Id. Doxey-LaytoiL as well as the majority of cases in this area, deal with the
substitution of defendants, rather than plaintifis. Nevertheless, the policies in those cases
apply equally to cases such as this.
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Conversely, the Court finds that defendants have not met their burden with respect to
any of their arguments on their Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, plaintiffs Motion to Amend is HEREBY GRANTED and defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment is HEREBY DENIED.
As the prior order of the Court (of October 3, 1997) granting plaintiff leave to amend
was entered before the matter was ripe for decision, it is hereby withdrawn.
Dated November 1% , 1997.
BY THE COURT:

JON M MEMMOTT
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Ortpber
1997, postage prepaid, to the following:
Larry S. Jenkins
Susan J. Mueller
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark Graham, Pro Se
2211 East 1200 North
Layton,Utah 84040

]

Am^
ies E. Merrell
Law Clerk to the
Honorable Jon M Memmott
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Addendum D

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF D/fi^S e O l ^ I ^ P i i 'S3
STATE OF UTAH
MARK GRAHAM,

:.-. „' Y\(jLs
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT, THE DISTRICTS
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BOARD,
and LeGRAND BITTER, THE DISTRICT'S
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
Defendants.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S AND
DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 970700320

The matters of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants' cross-motion for
summary judgment come before the Court for decision on the parties' respective notices to
submit. The Court has reviewed both parties' pleadings and other submitted materials, as well as
the applicable law. Having done so, and now being fully advised, it is the Court's conclusion that
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied and defendants' motion for summary
judgment should be granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds no dispute as to the following relevant material facts:1
1.

That defendant Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery

Special Service District ("District") is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and a
"governmental entity" pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9);

1

The Court has taken the following facts from the parties' memoranda in support and opposition of
their respective motions. Plaintiffs facts are not supported by any reference to the record, but as defendant raises
no objection and does not dispute such facts, the Court will allow them. Plaintiff disputes several of defendant's
(properly supported) facts, but only on legal grounds which the Court dismisses and as to their relevancy, not their
truthfulness or accuracy. Furthermore, plaintiff provides no reference to any record which would put their
truthfulness at issue.

2.

That defendant Administrative Control Board ("Board") is the governing body of

the district, and has the legal authority to make determinations regarding public access to records
in the district's offices and agencies. The Board is also a "governmental entity" pursuant to
U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9);
3.

That defendant Bitter is and was at also times relevant to this action the executive

director of the District. The Executive Director's office is a "governmental entity" pursuant to
U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9);
4.

That in February and April of 1997, the District performed initial compliance

testing as required by condition no. 8 of the Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96 dated
September 10, 1996 ("Approval Order") issued by the State of Utah Department of
Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality;
5.

That on April 28,1997 plaintiff submitted a written request to the District

pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-2-101 etseq. of the Utah Government Records access and Management
Act ("GRAMA") for the right to inspect as well as copy certain governmental records
concerning the 1997 stack tests;
6.

That the written request asked for:

1.
The current contract(s) between the Special Service District and Dr. H. Gregor Rigo
and/or his firm, Rigo & Rigo Associates;
2.
Records relating to the stack test(s) conducted during January and/or February, 1997,
namely:
a.

samples taken, journals, personal field notes, and inspection logs;

b.

laboratory analysis of air samples taken;

c.
any correspondence between the District and the entities responsible for
gathering and/or analyzing and evaluating the air samples subsequent to the date of
sampling;
d.
memos or internal documents (within the Special Service District) relating
to the stack test or the laboratory analysis;
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e.
any deviation or departure from the prescribed methods for gathering;
samples and their reason(s), or problems encountered during the sample gathering
process.
7.

That on May 7, 1997 the District responded to plaintiff in writing. The letter said,

in relevant part,"... copies will not be made until further request is made by you," and went on
to say, "Staff time and overhead will be billed at $20.00 per hour for compilation of the
documents;
8.

That on May 22, 1997 plaintiff wrote to the District asking the District to set a

date between May 27 and June 10 (but excluding June 4) for inspection of the requested
government records;
9.

That on May 29, 1997 the District sent plaintiff some of the material requested,

specifically, the District's contract with Rigo and Rigo Associates;
10.

That on June 4, 1997 the District responded in writing by stating its intention to

charge the plaintiff $280.00 for staff time before allowing plaintiff to either inspect or copy the
requested material;
11.

That on June 9,1997 plaintiff appealed the District's denial to Bitter, the

District's executive director, pursuant to the District's Ordinance 92-C, which is in accordance
with GRAMA;
12.

That on June 24, 1997 Bitter responded in writing, denying the appeal;

13.

That on July 2, 1997 plaintiff appealed Bitter's decision to the Board at its

monthly meeting;
14.

That on July 2, 1997 the Board voted to deny plaintiffs appeal, sending written

notice of that vote the next day;
15.

That the District has never claimed that the government records requested by

plaintiff are private, controlled or protected, or that plaintiff has no right to inspect such records;
16.

That this action was filed July 30, 1997;
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17.

That because of the variety of records involved in accommodating Mr. Graham's

request, the District could not and did not store them in one document, computer program, or
central file;
18.

That the District had to take files, documents, and data from several sources and

organize them in order to respond to Mr. Graham's request;
19.

That the district made a thorough search of all files and records related to the

testing to insure that the District produced everything relevant;
20.

That in order to do so, it was necessary for the District to contact those people

who may have been involved in the testing at issue and obtain their assistance;
21.

That John Watson, Bart Baker, certain operators and maintenance personnel, and

Jack Schmidt searched, retrieved, and compiled the records requested by Mr. Graham.
Collectively, they spent a total of 14 hours;
22.

That the District retrieved and compiled information from District files located at

individual employees' work stations, daytimers, operator logs, testing protocols, general District
files that may relate to testing, and a computer database;
23.

That research on the computer database was a time-consuming process. The

database is continually updated, and after a period of time, information stored in the database is
downloaded to tape. Some of the information Mr. Graham requested had been stored on tape,
requiring an operator to peruse the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the
information plaintiff requested;
24.

That the district assessed plaintiff a $280.00 fee based on the 14 hours actually

expended for the several searches by the District staff;
25.

That in compliance with GRAMA and the Ordinance, plaintiff will not be charged

for time incurred in reviewing the records to determine whether they were private, controlled or
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protected under GRAMA, although a review of the records requested by plaintiff was made to
make such a determination;
26.

That staff time charges assessed by the District on plaintiffs records request were

based on the Ordinance, but were less than actual cost because employees who reviewed the files
are paid more than $20.00 per hour;
27.

That recently, the District was charged $25.00 per hour for staff time incurred by

Hill Air Force Base in responding to Freedom of Information Act request by the District.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before turning to the merits of the case, the Court notes the applicable standard of review.
Summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bevnon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #
1743, 854 P.2d 513, 514-515 (Utah 1993): see also Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d
1272, 1274 (Utah 1993).
In considering a motion for summary judgement, the Court must examine the evidence in
"a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414,
415 (Utah 1990). Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing
summary judgment, see Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), and when a motion for
summary judgment is filed and supported by an affidavit or affidavits, the party opposing the
motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah
1989); Thavne v. Beneficial Utah Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Rule 4-501 (2)(b) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration states:
(b)
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
5

sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. AH material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported bv an accurate reference to the record
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted bv the opposing party's statement.
(emphasis added)
LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND RULING
Upon competing motions for summary judgment, there appear to be few disputed facts
between the parties. Plaintiff, in his reply memo, well characterizes the essential dispute
between the parties as concerning the interpretation and application of GRAMA statutes,
specifically U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2), to the facts of this case. U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2) reads as
follows:
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that
normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this section
may include the following:
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, or tailoring the
record either into an organization or media to meet the person's request;
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and other direct
administrative costs for complying with a request. The hourly charge may not
exceed the salary of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of the
custodian of records, has the necessary skill and training to perform the
request; provided, however, that no charge may be made for the first quarter
hour of staff time; and
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the result of
computer output other than word processing, the actual incremental
cost of providing the electronic services and products together with
a reasonable portion of the costs associated with formatting or
interfacing the information for particular users, and the administrative
costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and (b).
Defendants argue that the $280.00 fee they request is provided for by the statute. Plaintiff argues
it is not. The parties are before the Court, requesting the Court resolve their dispute.
Plaintiffs critical argument revolves around the meaning of the words "compile" and
"form" and their context, in the phrase: "When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form
other than that normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this
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section may include the following: [.]" Plaintiff argues that the meanings of "compile" and
"form" are vague and ambiguous and as such must be construed as narrowly as possible, thereby
excluding all charges for any records that are already maintained by the government agency, and
only allowing charges for a record that is "transformed" into a different record. Defendants
argue that the fees they are charging are allowable under the plain reading of the statute.
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed guidelines on statutory construction as follows:
The applicable principles of statutory construction are clear. "We look first to the
plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent
'Only when we find
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy consideration.'"
Citv of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996). Furthermore,
Indeed, it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and... of language
itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used."
State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311,313 (Utah 1995). Finally, "[w]e must assume that each term in the
statute was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied
according to its usually accepted meaning." West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah
1982).
In the Court's opinion, the statute is neither vague nor ambiguous, nor is it difficult to
construct, given the plain meaning of its terms. Defendants provide that Webster's New World
Dictionary defines "compile" as: "to gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly
form" and "to compose (a book, etc.) of materials gathered from various sources." Webster's
defines "form," inter alia, as: "the particular mode of existence a thing has or takes;"
"arrangement, esp. orderly arrangement; way in which parts of a whole are organized; pattern;
style.. ."2

2

Webster's New World Dictionary, (2d ed. 1980) 290, and 548, respectively. By coincidence, the
Court uses the same dictionary, and has reviewed these citations for accuracy.
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Plaintiffs request consists of records falling into five separate categories (see, Court's
Findings of Fact No. 6, a-e, supra). Defendants' unrebutted evidence, from the affidavit of John
K. Schmidt submitted in support of their memorandum, shows that 14 hours of staff time was
spent in responding to plaintiffs request (see, Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 17-23, supra).
From the facts submitted it is quite clear to the Court that the requested fee was incurred as a
direct result of the District's "summarizing, compiling [and] tailoring the record either into an
organization or media to meet the person's request;" their "search, retrieval, and other direct
administrative costs for complying with [the] request; and "the actual incremental cost of
providing the electronic services and products together with a reasonable portion of the costs
associated with formatting or interfacing the information for particular users, and the
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and (b)." [See U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2)(a)-(c).]
Plaintiff argues that the District should have been able to respond to his requests by
simply retrieving the records and presenting them to him, yet does not support these allegations
by evidence acceptable under Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P.3 As made clear by defendants, the records
were kept in neither the form nor the media requested by plaintiff and they therefore needed to be
"compiled" into that form to conform to his requests.
The Court finds that the common meaning of the terms "compile" and "form"would
include the work performed by the District. As further support, the context of the words within
the statute supports this conclusion. "Compile" is the only verb in U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2)
defining what actual costs may be charged for. Therefore, as the same section goes on to state
"the actual costs under this section may include the following...,"

any of the tasks listed at 63-2-

203(2)(a) through (c) must, by necessity, be encompassed within the term "compile." Any other

3

Plaintiffs comment with respect to the storage capacity of Iomega "Zip" data storage drives is
neither supported by evidence, nor relevant. Defendants supported averment is that the data had to be pulled from
several sources, and that old files were constantly being put on computer storage tapes, necessitating the time for
perusing such files to find and copy the relevant requested material.
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reading of the section would be nonsensical, and, in the Court's opinion, could only with great
difficulty be seriously argued.
Plaintiff does not dispute the actual number of staff hours worked nor the rate charged.
As such, the Court would find both reasonable under the statute as well as in the Court's
experience. In sum, the Court finds defendant's facts and arguments persuasive, and would
award summary judgement in their favor.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is HEREBY DENIED. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is
HEREBY GRANTED.
No attorneys' fees are awarded.
Dated April J n _ , 1998.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on April
, 1998, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark Graham
Plaintiff Pro Se
2211 East 1200 North
Layton, Utah 84040
Larry S. Jenkins
Susan J. Mueller
Attorneys for Defendants
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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